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ABSTRACT 
There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according 
to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in 
knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the 
number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress 
is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these 
accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors 
think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, 
Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes 
progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén 
claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress 
than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic 
account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account. 
KEYWORDS: epistemology of modality; factivity; knowledge; noetic account; scientific 
progress; understanding 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scientific progress is still one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science 
today, since, as Chang states, neither “philosophers nor scientists themselves have been 
able to” settle this issue “to general satisfaction” (Chang 2007, p. 1). And this state of 
facts can be explained considering the “immense difficulty” of the topic. 
Certainly, one of the main difficulties that arises in developing an account of scientific 
progress is to find the way to coherently take into account both of the two main 
characteristic features of science development: 1) theory change, which seems to 
unequivocally emerge every time we carefully analyse one of the main transitions in the 
historical development of science, and 2) the striking empirical success of our best 
scientific theories, which, according to scientific realism at least, i.e. the nowadays 
mainstream view in philosophy of science, cannot be adequately explained without 
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referring to the (approximate) truth of our best theories (Niiniluoto 2015b; Chakravartty 
2015). 
Those two features of science development pull in different directions, hence the 
difficulty of giving a satisfying account of progress. Indeed, if a radical theory change 
occurs, the past theory should be regarded as false. But realists consider empirical success 
a good indicator of truth, and claim that successful theories are (approximately) true. So, 
if a theory enjoys empirical success, it should not undergo a really radical change and 
finally be dismissed as false. But history of science seems to provide examples of once-
successful theories that have nevertheless been successively dismissed, and for which it is 
not easy to demonstrate that there is some continuity between the new theories and the 
replaced ones.1 Did those past false theories constitute instances of genuine scientific 
progress? It depends on how we conceive of progress, namely on which requirements we 
think have to be fulfilled in order for a theory to be regarded as progressive. For example, 
if you take a realist stance on progress, you probably will require a theory to be 
(approximately) true in order to consider it an instance of progress. 
In other words, the debate about scientific progress intersects the debate about 
scientific realism, i.e. the central topic in philosophy of science (Chakravartty 2015). For 
example, if we take the debate over scientific realism to be about what the aim of science 
is,2 then the relation between these two debates may be described as follows: 
  
X is the aim of science just in case science makes progress when X increases or 
accumulates. (Dellsén, 2016, p. 73).3 
 
Thus, determining the aim of science is relevant for the investigations on scientific 
progress, since it may give us a sort of criterion to determine whether progress occurred 
or not. For example, if in analyzing a historical case C, we find that there has been an 
increase in X during C, and X is the aim of science, we can conclude that C did constitute 
a case of progress. But even determining whether progress occurred or not is relevant in 
order to support or attack a specific view on what is the aim of science. For example, if 
we are able to show that in case D, although it is uncontroversial that D constitutes 
progress, X did not increase, we can affirm that X cannot be taken to be the aim of 
science. 
Recently, Dellsén (2016) proposed a new conception of scientific progress, the noetic 
account,4 according to which an episode in science is progressive when there is an 
increase in scientists’ understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén’s noetic account is mainly 
devoted to overcoming some of the inadequacies that afflict the epistemic account of 
                                                 
1 Cf. e.g. Niiniluoto 2015b, sec. 3.5: “many past theories were not approximately true or 
truthlike. Ptolemy’s geocentric theory was rejected in the Copernican revolution, not retained in 
the form ‘approximately Ptolemy’. Indeed, the progressive steps from Ptolemy to Copernicus or 
from Newton to Einstein are not only matters of improved precision but involve changes in 
theoretical postulates and laws.” 
2 Claiming that the debate over scientific realism is about what is the aim of science is just one 
of the many possible ways to define such debate that have been proposed so far (Chakravartty 
2015), and it is used here just for illustrative purpose. Which characterization of scientific realism 
is the most adequate one does not impinge on the present article, since for any possible 
characterization of the debate over scientific realism, it is possible to define how this debate and 
the debate over scientific progress intersect each other in a way similar to the one presented here. 
For similar reasons, it is not relevant here to survey the different proposals that have been 
advanced on what is the aim of science. 
3 See also Niiniluoto (2015b); Bird (2007). 
4 On the reason why Dellsén named his view ‘noetic’, cf. Dellsén 2016, p. 72, fn. 2: “‘Noetic’ as 
in the Greek ‘nous’, which is often translated into English as ‘understanding’.” 
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progress developed by Bird (2007). Bird’s proposal, notwithstanding the criticisms it 
received (see e.g. Rowbottom 2010; Saatsi 2016), has had wide resonance, since it 
revived a debate about scientific progress in which the two main accounts were the 
semantic account and the problem-solving account (see below, sec. 2), and it still remains 
one of the accounts of progress more congenial to scientific realists. 
Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific 
progress than the epistemic one. This article aims precisely at assessing whether the 
noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic one. The 
article is organized as follows: the three main accounts of scientific progress are 
presented (sec. 2); then Dellsén’s proposal is illustrated (sec. 3) and the concept of 
understanding is analysed in some detail (sec. 4); an argument is then proposed, which 
aims to assess whether the noetic account is an adequate realist view of progress by 
testing it against an uncontroversial yet problematic case of progress (sec. 5); it is pointed 
out that Dellsén’s view of understanding is wanting, and it is examined whether the 
modality-based view of understanding recently proposed by Rice (2016) may represent a 
valid option to ‘fix’ the noetic account (sec. 6); since this option is shown to be available 
only at a very high cost, i.e. the commitment to some form of possible-worlds modal 
realism, it is examined whether another more promising realist account of modality, i.e. 
modalism, may be of use to support Dellsén’s account (sec. 7); finally, some conclusions 
are drawn (sec. 8). 
 
 
2. The main accounts of scientific progress 
 
Three main accounts of scientific progress may be found in the extant literature: 1) the 
epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when 
there is an increase in knowledge (Bird 2007); 2) the semantic account, according to 
which progress is made when either the number of truths or the verisimilitude of a theory 
increases, depending on which variant of this account we are dealing with (Popper 1963; 
Niiniluoto 2015a); 3) and the problem-solving account, according to which progress is 
made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases (Kuhn 1970; 
Laudan 1977). 
Those conceptions mainly differ for the concept they take to be central in order to 
account for scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account is based on the concept of 
“knowledge”; 2) the semantic account is based on the concept of “truth” (or 
“verisimilitude”, depending on which formulation of this approach we adopt); 3) the 
problem-solving account is based on the concept of “problem-solving”. Being based on 
different concepts, those accounts lead to different outcomes in determining whether an 
episode has to be regarded as a genuine instance of scientific progress or not. 
Each of the above described accounts of progress has received several criticisms in the 
last decades (see Niiniluoto 2015b for a survey). Each of these accounts, indeed, seems 
unable, relying on its proper criteria of progressiveness, to account for the 
progressiveness of some episodes that are instead usually taken to represent genuine cases 
of scientific progress. Finding out this sort of counterexample to the definition of progress 
given by rival accounts has been (and is still) the main business in the dispute over 
scientific progress.  
To better illustrate this way of attacking rival accounts, and to present more in detail 
Bird’s conception of progress, i.e. the conception that is mainly discussed by Dellsén, and 
from which Dellsén moves to develop his own proposal, we will describe some of the 
arguments given by Bird to support the inadequacy of the semantic conception (sec. 2.1) 
and the inadequacy of the problem-solving conception (sec. 2.2).  
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2.1. Bird’s criticism of the semantic account 
 
Bird’s defense of the epistemic view of progress, a view that can be traced back to Bacon 
(Bird 2007, p. 87, n. 1), begins with the consideration that this view is the one that better 
accounts for the intuitive meaning of scientific progress. Indeed, according to Bird, if we 
ask ourselves what scientific progress is, the intuitive answer is simple: science “makes 
progress precisely when it shows the accumulation of scientific knowledge; an episode in 
science is progressive when at the end of the episode there is more knowledge than at the 
beginning” (Bird 2007, p. 64). 
In other words, in Bird’s view, the epistemic conception is better than other accounts 
of progress, because those episodes in the history of science that according to our 
intuition represent genuine cases of progress are all cases in which an increase in 
knowledge occurs. At the same time, it is not always possible to observe in such cases a 
corresponding increase in the number of truths or in the number of problems that we are 
able to solve. So, the epistemic account fares better than other accounts of progress, and 
has to be preferred. 
It is worth specifying that Bird takes knowledge to be not merely “justified true 
belief”; rather he takes it to be “true belief justified in a non-accidental way”. In this way, 
he tries to avoid the possibility that an accidentally justified true belief may be regarded 
as an instance of genuine scientific progress:  
 
we know that knowledge is not justified true belief, thanks to Gettier’s counter-
examples. Are then truth and justification jointly sufficient for a new scientific belief 
adding to progress? No, for precisely the same reasons that they do not add to 
knowledge. We may construct a Gettier style case of a scientific belief that is 
accidentally true and also justified [...]. Such a case will not be a contribution to 
progress. (Bird 2007, p. 72). 
 
So, in Bird’s view, while truth and justification are necessarily required for a new 
scientific belief to be regarded as an instance of scientific progress, that belief merely 
being true and justified is not sufficient to make it a genuine instance of scientific 
progress.  
It is exactly following this line of reasoning that Bird develops his attack on the 
semantic view of progress. Indeed, in order to point out the implausibility of the semantic 
view, Bird asks us to consider the following scenario: 
 
Imagine a scientific community that has formed its beliefs using some very weak or 
even irrational method M, such as astrology. But by fluke this sequence of beliefs is 
a sequence of true beliefs. [...]. Now imagine that at time t an Archimedes-like 
scientist in this society realises and comes to know that M is weak. This scientist 
persuades (using different, reliable methods) her colleagues that M is unreliable. 
[...]. The scientific community now rejects its earlier beliefs as unsound, realising 
that they were formed solely on the basis of a poor method. (Bird 2007, p. 66). 
 
The problem for Bird is that if we adopt the semantic view, we should describe this 
case as follows: this community was experiencing progress until time t, because the 
number of truths held by the community was increasing, while after time t the community 
started experiencing a regress, because it gave up the true beliefs previously accumulated, 
and so their number decreased. According to Bird, this way of representing this scenario 
is unacceptable, since it contradicts our intuition, according to which things go exactly 
the other way around: giving up beliefs produced by an unreliable method is a 
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progressive episode, and should not be judged as regressive. On the other hand, merely 
accumulating beliefs through an unreliable method cannot represent a real instance of 
progress, despite the accidental truth of those beliefs. 
Thus, according to Bird, the trend of progress growth matches the trend of knowledge 
growth, and not the trend of growth of the number of truths. 
 
 
2.2. Bird’s criticism of the problem-solving account   
 
Bird (2007) elaborates a different scenario in order to criticize the problem-solving 
account of progress. He constructs his argument starting from an example made by 
Laudan (1977) in order to support the problem-solving account.5  
Consider the following historical episode: Nicole d’Oresme and his contemporaries 
believed that hot goat’s blood would split diamonds. Now, for Kuhn (1970) a puzzle is 
solved when a proposed solution is sufficiently similar to a relevant paradigmatic puzzle-
solution. According to Laudan, a problem P is solved when the phenomenon represented 
by P can be deduced from a theory T. But Laudan does not require that either P or T be 
true: “A problem need not accurately describe a real state of affairs to be a problem: all 
that is required is that it be thought to be an actual state of affairs” (Laudan 1977, p. 16). 
In this perspective, if Oresme’s solution to the problem of splitting diamonds is 
sufficiently similar to a relevant paradigmatic solution in his historical context, according 
to Kuhn’s standards, Oresme’s solution provides a genuine solution to that problem, and 
thus, since progress amounts to problem-solving, it represents scientific progress. 
Moreover, if Oresme and his contemporaries were able to give a theory from which the 
splitting of diamonds by hot goat’s blood is deducible, Oresme’s solution represents 
scientific progress according to Laudan’s standards as well. 
The main problem with the problem-solving account of progress, according to Bird, is 
that both Kuhn and Laudan, i.e. the main supporters of this account, do not think of 
solving a problem as involving “knowledge”, if knowledge is understood in the classical 
way as requiring (at least) truth. And this fact, in Bird’s view, leads those who adopt this 
account to judge certain historical episodes or hypothetical scenarios in a way that 
contradicts our intuition about what scientific progress is. Consider again Oresme’s 
scenario: 
 
imagine that some second scholar later comes along and proves at time t by 
impeccable means that Oresme’s solution cannot work. Whereas we had a solution 
before, we now have no solution. [...]. By Laudan and Kuhn’s standards that would 
mark a regress. (Bird 2007, p. 69). 
 
This way of representing the dynamic of scientific progress in this scenario is, 
according to Bird, unacceptable, since it contradicts our intuition, according to which 
things go exactly the other way round: since Oresme’s solution was not a real solution, 
because it is demonstrably ineffective, the community was not experiencing any progress 
                                                 
5 Bird’s presentation of the problem-solving account does not do justice to the theoretical 
richness of this approach. For reasons of space, we follow Bird. For some recent works that 
innovate the problem-solving view, see Cellucci (2013), Ippoliti (2014), Ippoliti, Cellucci (2016), 
who advocate the heuristic view, according to which knowledge increases when, to solve a 
problem, a hypothesis “is produced that is a sufficient condition for solving it. The hypothesis is 
obtained from the problem, and possibly other data already available, by some non-deductive rule, 
and must be plausible […]. But the hypothesis is in its turn a problem that must be solved, and is 
solved in the same way” (Cellucci 2013, p. 55). 
PENULTIMATE DRAFT – PLEASE CITE THE PUBLISHED VERSION 
To appear in: Danks, D.; Ippoliti, E. (eds.), Building Theories, Springer, Cham. 
 
6 
 
until time t, while when at time t such alleged solution was demonstrated to be ineffective 
by reliable means, that very fact constituted progress for the community. 
In other words, according to Bird, while Oresme’s solution “might reasonably have 
seemed to Oresme and his contemporaries to be a contribution to progress, it is surely 
mistaken to think that this is therefore a contribution to progress (Bird 2007, p. 69). In 
order to decide whether a solution is a real solution, and so whether it represents a 
genuine progressive episode, we have to refer to our own current standards on what is 
true in that domain, i.e. to our knowledge.  
It is worth underlining here that Bird explicitly refers to our current knowledge in 
order to rebut Oresme’s solution: indeed, he admits that it is reasonable to claim that such 
solution might have seemed to Oresme and his contemporaries, according to their system 
of beliefs, an instance of genuine knowledge, even if it is in fact not really an instance of 
genuine knowledge, according to our current knowledge.   
Thus, according to Bird, the trend of progress growth matches the trend of knowledge 
growth, and not the trend of growth of the number of solved problems. 
 
 
3. The noetic account of scientific progress 
 
Recently, Dellsén (2016a) maintained that Bird’s account of scientific progress is 
inadequate, and proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science 
constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. 
The peculiarity of this account with respect to its rivals is that it is based on the 
concept of “understanding”, rather than on the concept of knowledge, truth, or problem-
solving.  
Generally speaking, “understanding” has to be intended here as it is usually intended 
in the debate over understanding and the value of knowledge that has spread in the last 
decade both in epistemology and philosophy of science.6 More precisely, according to 
Dellsén, “understanding” has to be construed as the ability of a subject to explain or 
predict some aspect of a phenomenon. In this perspective, an agent has some “scientific 
understanding of a given target just in case she grasps how to correctly explain and/or 
predict some aspects of the target in the right sort of circumstances” (Dellsén 2016a, p. 
75). Thus, in Dellsén’s view, “an episode in science is progressive precisely when 
scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of 
the episode than at the beginning” (Dellsén 2016a, p. 72). 
Dellsén claims that, since the noetic account rests on the concept of understanding 
instead of the concept of knowledge, the noetic account fares better than the epistemic 
one, because it is able to account for two classes of events that the epistemic account is 
not able to account for, namely: 1) cases in which progress occurs, while no increase in 
knowledge occurs (sec. 3.1); and 2) cases in which an increase in knowledge occurs, 
while no progress is made (sec. 3.2).  
 
 
3.1. Progress without knowledge increase 
 
                                                 
6 For a survey on the issue of understanding, see Baumberger, Beisbart, Brun (2017); de Regt, 
Leonelli, Eigner (2009). On the related issue of the value of knowledge, see Pritchard and Turri 
(2014) for a survey. With regard to the debate over understanding in epistemology, see Elgin 
(2007), (2009); Kvanvig (2003); Zagzebski (2001); with regard to the debate over understanding 
in philosophy of science, see de Regt (2009), (2015); de Regt and Gijsbers (2017); Mizrahi (2012); 
Khalifa (2011), Grimm (2006). 
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In order to point out the inadequacy of the epistemic account, Dellsén (2016a) considers 
Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion in terms of the kinetic theory of heat, 
presented in one of his famous annus mirabilis papers, “On the Movement of Small 
Particles Suspended in a Stationary Liquid Demanded by the Molecular-kinetic Theory of 
Heat” (Einstein 1905/1956). Einstein’s paper’s first paragraph reads: 
 
In this paper it will be shown that according to the molecular-kinetic theory of heat, 
bodies of microscopically-visible size suspended in a liquid will perform movements 
of such magnitude that they can be easily observed in a microscope, on account of 
the molecular motions of heat. It is possible that the movements to be discussed here 
are identical with the so-called ‘Brownian molecular motion’; however, the 
information available to me regarding the latter is so lacking in precision, that I can 
form no judgment in the matter. (Einstein 1905/1956, p. 1). 
 
Dellsén maintains that if we adopt the epistemic account of scientific progress, we 
should conclude that Einstein’s contribution does not represent a case of genuine 
progress. Indeed, the epistemic account rests on the concept of knowledge, and 
knowledge requires (at least) truth and justification. Since Einstein’s information on 
Brownian motion was lacking, Einstein clearly did not have “the epistemic justification 
required to know that the movements in question were in fact real. Thus, the 
explanandum in Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion did not constitute knowledge 
for Einstein at the time” (Dellsén 2016a, p. 76). Moreover, the kinetic theory on which 
Einstein’s paper rests was in 1905 a disputed theory, and many reputable scientists did 
not accept the existence of atoms at that time (Perrin’s decisive results were published 
starting from 1908, see Perrin 1908). So, also the explanans in Einstein’s explanation of 
Brownian motion did not constitute a clear case of knowledge when Einstein published 
his paper. 
Given that according to the epistemic account, scientific progress occurs when an 
increase in knowledge occurs, since in this case it cannot be affirmed that an increase in 
knowledge occurred, because neither the explanans nor the explanandum were known at 
the time, we should conclude that Einstein’s contribution to science did not constitute 
progress in 1905. 
According to Dellsén, this way of evaluating this historical episode is unacceptable, 
since it is unable to accommodate our common intuitions on what constitutes scientific 
progress. For Dellsén, this case underlines the inadequacy of the epistemic account in 
dealing with those cases in which progress occurs even if this progress cannot be said to 
constitute an increase in knowledge at the time when it occurs.  
On the contrary, according to the noetic account, in 1905 a remarkable “cognitive” 
progress occurred, even if there wasn’t a simultaneous increase in scientific “knowledge”, 
since an explanation of an (until then) unexplained phenomenon was proposed. And 
Einstein’s explanation was able to integrate such a phenomenon into a wider set of 
already explained phenomena, making it coherent with background knowledge, and so 
increasing the intelligibility of the phenomenon. In other words, an increase in the 
understanding of Brownian motion occurred in 1905.  
In order to defend the epistemic account, it may be objected that Einstein’s 
contribution to scientific progress consisted in gaining the knowledge that the kinetic 
theory would explain Brownian motion, if the kinetic theory is true. In this view, 
“Einstein’s achievement amounts to gaining a kind of hypothetical explanatory 
knowledge – knowledge of how a potential explanans would explain a potential 
explanandum if the explanans and explanandum are both true” (Dellsén 2016a, p. 77). 
Unfortunately, this option seems to be unavailable for the supporter of the epistemic 
account. Indeed, if achieving some hypothetical explanatory knowledge may constitute 
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genuine progress for the epistemic account, then this account is no more able to rule out 
Oresme’s solution to the problem of splitting diamonds. In this view, to make Oresme’s 
solution an acceptable solution, it would have been sufficient for its supporters to provide 
some theory about the supposed relation between hot goat’s blood and diamonds, 
arranged in such a way that if this theory and Oresme’s solution are true, then such theory 
would explain the splitting of diamonds through hot goat’s blood. This theory would be 
an instance of hypothetical explanatory knowledge, and so it should be taken to constitute 
progress. But Bird, as we have seen, explicitly denies that Oresme’s solution may 
constitute an instance of scientific progress. It is important to stress that, in order to 
discriminate between Oresme’s and Einstein’s cases, taking into account whether a 
hypothetical explanatory knowledge has later been confirmed is not a workable criterion. 
Indeed, if hypothetical explanatory knowledge has to wait until it is confirmed to be 
regarded as a genuine instance of progress, then it is not distinguishable from ordinary 
knowledge, and we should maintain that progress occurs when knowledge is acquired, i.e. 
when confirmation occurs. But if this is the case, then the epistemic account would again 
be unable to claim that genuine progress occurred in 1905 thanks to Einstein’s work. So, 
the supporter of the epistemic account faces a dilemma: either she accepts that 
hypothetical explanatory knowledge may constitute an instance of genuine progress, and 
then she has to accept that Oresme’s solution may have constituted progress, or she 
denies that hypothetical explanatory knowledge may constitute an instance of genuine 
progress, and then she has to accept that she is unable to assert that Einstein’s work 
constituted progress in 1905. If she takes the first horn and accepts hypothetical 
explanatory knowledge, she has also to accept that an instance of progress may be 
considered as such independently of its confirmation. But, as we have seen above (sec. 
2.2), Bird explicitly claims that whether a belief (or a theory, a solution, etc.) constitutes 
genuine knowledge has to be determined with respect to our current knowledge, i.e. from 
a point of view from which we can assess whether that belief has been confirmed or not. 
So, the supporter of the epistemic account has to take the second horn of the dilemma, 
and conclude that her account of progress is unable to assert that Einstein’s work 
constituted progress in 1905.  
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that accepting hypothetical explanatory knowledge is 
not a viable proposal for the epistemic account, and that this account is unable to account 
for those cases that are equivalent to Einstein’s case, i.e. cases in which an increase in the 
understanding of a phenomenon occurs, and we are justified in claiming that it in fact 
occurred, even if there was not a simultaneous increase in knowledge at the time it 
occurred. 
It is worth underlining here that if, as Dellsén claims, the noetic account fares better 
than the epistemic account when dealing with this kind of case, this means that in 
Dellsén’s view, whether a theory constitutes an increase in the understanding of a 
phenomenon at the time it is proposed, and so whether a theory constitutes progress, is 
independent of its later confirmation or rebuttal. In other words, the verdict on whether a 
theory provides an increase in the understanding of a phenomenon at time tx, cannot be 
dependent on whether such theory will be confirmed and judged to be true in a specified 
later historical context tx+n (for example: “according to our best current knowledge”, as in 
the case of Bird’s evaluation of Oresme’s solution), or in some unspecified later historical 
context (for example: “if the theory will be confirmed in the future”, as in the case of 
hypothetical explanatory knowledge). The verdict on the increase of understanding (i.e. 
the capacity to explain or predict some aspect of the target phenomenon) has to be 
provided with respect to the context in which it occurred. 
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3.2. Knowledge increase without progress 
 
Dellsén elaborates his proposal, and moves his criticisms to Bird’s view, starting from a 
scenario which was proposed by Bird himself in his 2007 paper, and which was devoted 
to showing how an increase in scientific knowledge does not constitute progress in all 
circumstances. Bird describes this scenario as follows: 
 
imagine a team of researchers engaged in the process of counting, measuring, and 
classifying geologically the billions of grains of sand on a beach between two points. 
Grant that this may add to scientific knowledge. But it does not add much to 
understanding. Correspondingly it adds little to scientific progress. (Bird 2007, p. 
84). 
 
It is easy to agree with Bird. This classificatory activity represents a genuine instance 
of accumulation of scientific knowledge, since the research produces true beliefs relative 
to the state of the world that are justified in a non-accidental way according to scientific 
standards and methods. And certainly, it is difficult to figure out how this activity may 
increase our comprehension of the world. Nevertheless, this apparently innocent 
consideration constitutes, according to Dellsén, an insurmountable difficulty for the 
supporters of the epistemic account, because they are unable to accommodate this 
consideration with the very qualifying claim of the epistemic account, i.e. that the trend of 
knowledge accumulation matches the trend of scientific progress. If this is the case, then 
for every instance of accumulated knowledge, however insignificant, we should identify a 
correspondent (i.e. equivalent) instance of scientific progress. If, on the contrary, an 
increase in scientific knowledge can occur without being correlated to an equivalent 
increase in progress, then we should deny that scientific progress has to be identified with 
knowledge accumulation, as the supporters of the epistemic account maintain. 
It is interesting to note that Bird himself suggests that the discrepancy between 
knowledge accumulation and progress growth is due to whether understanding increases. 
Dellsén elaborates exactly on this suggestion to develop his noetic account, according to 
which scientific progress has to be identified with increase in understanding. 
Examples equivalent to Bird’s “counting grains of sand” scenario may be multiplied. 
Consider all those cases in which spurious correlations are identified and correctly 
deemed as such.7 Dellsén reports an interesting case: 
    
it happens to be true that there is a strong correlation between increases in childbirth 
rates outside of Berlin city hospitals and increases in stork populations around the 
city. When this piece of information was published in a[n] article that warned 
against coincidental statistical associations [...] there was an accumulation of 
knowledge that would have to count as scientific progress on the epistemic account. 
However, this information provides no understanding since it does not enable us to 
correctly explain or predict any aspect of childbirth rates or stork populations [...]. 
Intuitively, this is not a case of scientific progress. (Dellsén 2016a, p. 78). 
                                                 
7 On what spurious correlations are, cf. Dellsén 2016a, p. 78: “Suppose we have two variables 
V1 and V2 that are known on independent grounds to be unrelated, causally and nomologically. Let 
us further suppose that we learn, i.e. come to know, that there is some specific statistical 
correlation between V1 and V2 – e.g. such that a greater value for V1 is correlated with a greater 
value for V2.” This correlation represents an instance of spurious correlation, i.e. a correlation 
between two variables which is not due to any real relation between them. In these cases, such a 
correlation does not convey any information on the correlated variables, nor on some other 
relevant aspect of the world, so it is useless, irrelevant, or worse, it may lead us astray, if we do not 
identify it as spurious. 
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To make Dellsén’s remark more general, it may be useful to consider a paper recently 
published by Calude and Longo (2016). They base their argument, among other things, 
on Ramsey theory, i.e. the branch of combinatorics which investigates the conditions 
under which order must appear. If we restrict our attention to mathematical series, more 
precisely to arithmetic progressions, Ramsey theory investigates the conditions under 
which an arithmetic progression must appear in a string of numbers. 
Calude’s and Longo’s analysis hinges on Van der Waerden’s theorem, according to 
which for any “positive integers k and c there is a positive integer γ such that every string, 
made out of c digits or colours, of length more than γ contains an arithmetic progression 
with k occurrences of the same digit or colour, i.e. a monochromatic arithmetic 
progression of length k” (Calude, Longo 2016, p. 11). 
For example, if we take a binary string of x digits, digits can be either ‘0’ or ‘1’. Take 
‘0’ and ‘1’ to be the possible colours of those x digits, i.e. c = 2. From Ramsey theory, we 
know that there will be a number γ such that, if x is bigger than γ, that string will contain 
an arithmetic progression of length k such that all k digits of that progression are of the 
same colour, i.e. either all the k digits are ‘0’ or all the k digits are ‘1’.8 
Consider now a database D, where some kind of acquired information about some 
phenomenon P is stored. We want to investigate the correlations among the data stored in 
D in order to increase our knowledge of P:  
 
In full generality, we may consider that a correlation of variables in D is a set B of size b 
whose sets of n elements form the correlation […]. In other words, when a correlation 
function […] selects a set of n-sets, whose elements form a set of cardinality b, then they 
become correlated. Thus, the process of selection may be viewed as a colouring of the 
chosen set of b elements with the same colour—out of c possible ones. […]. Then Ramsey 
theorem shows that, given any correlation function and any b, n and c, there always exists a 
large enough number γ such that any set A of size greater than γ contains a set B of size b 
whose subsets of n elements are all correlated. (Calude, Longo 2016, p. 12).9 
 
Calude and Longo prove that the larger D is, the more spurious correlations will be 
found in it. In other words, when our stock of available data increases, most of the 
correlations that we can identify in it are spurious. Since large databases have to contain 
arbitrary correlations, owing to the size of data, not to the nature of data, the larger the 
databases are, the more the correlations in such databases are spurious. Thus, the more 
data we have, the more difficult is to extract meaningful knowledge from them.10 
                                                 
8 In this case (i.e. c = 2), if we have k = 3, then γ = 8. To see this, consider the following 
sequence of binary digits of length 8: 01100110. This string contains no arithmetic progression of 
length 3, because the positions 1, 4, 5, 8 (which are all ‘0’) and 2, 3, 6, 7 (which are all ‘1’) do not 
contain an arithmetic progression of length 3. However, if we add just one bit more to that string 
(i.e. if we add either ‘1’ or ‘0’), we obtain the following two strings: 011001100 and 011001101. 
Both these strings contain a monochromatic arithmetic progression of length 3. Consider 
011001100: positions 1, 5, 9 are all ‘0’. Consider 011001101: positions 3, 6, 9 are all ‘1’. More 
generally, it can be proved that if a string contains more than 8 digits, it will contain a 
monochromatic arithmetic progression of length 3. And in fact, all the 512 possible binary strings 
of length 9 contain a monochromatic arithmetic progression of length 3. 
9 It is important to stress that the nature of the correlation function is irrelevant: it can be 
completely arbitrary, i.e. in no way related to the nature of the data stored in the database. 
10 Cf. Calude, Longo 2016, p. 6: “it is exactly the size of the data that allows our result: the more 
data, the more arbitrary, meaningless and useless (for future action) correlations will be found in 
them.” It may be interesting to note that, in order to derive their result, Calude and Longo define 
“spurious” in a more restrictive way than Dellsén. According to them, “a correlation is spurious if 
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This result generalizes the difficulty deriving from the claim that scientific progress 
has to be identified with knowledge accumulation. Indeed, the search for spurious 
correlations within a stock of knowledge produces itself instances of knowledge, and so it 
contributes to the increase of the size of that stock of knowledge. But, as Calude and 
Longo demonstrate, the mere increasing of the stock of knowledge increases the number 
of spurious correlations that it is possible to find within it. Since, if our stock is 
sufficiently large, we can expect that most of the correlations that we can identify in it are 
spurious, we can also expect that the identification and the correct classification of these 
correlations as ‘spurious correlations’, while representing a genuine instance of 
knowledge, will hardly represent an instance of progress. So, the findings of spurious 
correlations are (almost) all cases in which knowledge increases while progress does not. 
And they are also cases that contribute to the increase of the number of possible spurious 
correlations, since they increase the stock of knowledge. Since the more spurious 
correlations are possible within a stock of knowledge, the more increasing our 
understanding becomes difficult,11 we may even hypothesize that, contrary to Bird’s 
view, in certain circumstances knowledge accumulation may ‘negatively’ contribute to an 
increase in the understanding of relevant phenomena.12 
According to Dellsén, the epistemic account is unable to account for all those relevant 
cases of knowledge production that do not imply an increase in progress, since it takes 
scientific progress to amount to knowledge accumulation. On the contrary, the noetic 
account is able to account for those cases, because while it acknowledges that those cases 
represent genuine instances of knowledge, it denies that they also constitute genuine 
instances of progress, given that they do not increase our understanding of the world, i.e. 
they do not enable us to correctly explain or predict any relevant aspect of the world. 
 
 
 
4. Knowledge and understanding: the problem of the factivity of knowledge 
 
We have seen that, according to Dellsén, the superiority of the noetic account with 
respect to the epistemic account is due to the fact that the noetic account is able to 
adequately account for some kinds of cases that the epistemic account is not able to 
adequately account for. In Dellsén’s view, the inadequacy of the epistemic account in 
accounting for such cases is due to some qualifying features of the concept on which the 
epistemic account rests, i.e. “knowledge”. In this perspective, the superiority of the noetic 
account is due to the fact that it rests on the concept of “understanding”. In other words, it 
would be thanks to some features of the concept of understanding that the noetic account 
fares better than the epistemic account. The question then arises: What are the differences 
between the concept of “knowledge” and the concept of “understanding” that allow 
“understanding” to perform better than “knowledge” when we deal with scientific 
progress? 
Before trying to answer this question, we have to keep in mind that we are dealing 
here with a realist perspective on science and scientific progress. The confrontation 
                                                                                                                                     
it appears in a ‘randomly’ generated database” (p. 13). Details can be found in Calude, Longo 
(2016). In any case, this does not impinge on the considerations that follow. 
11 Think ofthe increase in the understanding of some phenomenon X that may be derived by the 
findings of relevant (i.e. not-spurious) correlations among X and other phenomena Y and Z: if the 
number of spurious correlations increases, the number of correlations that we have to discard 
before finding the relevant ones increases too. Thus, increasing the understanding becomes more 
difficult when the number of spurious correlations increases. 
12 On a similar point, see Rancourt (2015). 
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between Bird and Dellsén takes place in a shared realist framework. Dellsén explicitly 
affirms that he considers his proposal to be a realist account of progress,13 and it is 
exactly for this reason that he takes the noetic account to be a valid alternative to Bird’s 
epistemic account, which is a full-blooded realist view of progress. Dellsén sees the 
noetic account as a sort of amelioration of the epistemic account. In his view, the noetic 
account is a more adequate (and nuanced) realist account of progress than the epistemic 
one, since it is able to satisfyingly account for more kinds of cases. 
Turning back to the differences between knowledge and understanding, one of the 
most salient is the strength of the truth and justification requirements: for a belief to be 
knowledge, it must be (at least) true and justified. On the contrary, in order to have some 
understanding of a phenomenon, what is required is the ability to make previsions or 
provide explanations relative to such phenomenon.14 But the history of science shows us 
that the capacity for providing explanations or making predictions may be due to beliefs 
or theories that are incomplete, (partially) false, or not yet empirically confirmed. So, the 
question is: Can this ability of making predictions and providing explanations, i.e. 
understanding, really be decoupled from the truth requirement?  
There is a bifurcation here: indeed, it is very possible to give a realist interpretation of 
the concept of understanding, according to which the ability to make predictions and 
provide explanations depends, in the ultimate analysis, on the truth of the theory we are 
dealing with; but another interpretation of the concept of understanding is also possible, 
which, since it is opposed to the previous one, can be labeled “anti-realist”, according to 
which the abilities of making predictions and providing explanations are not necessarily 
related to the truth of the theory we are dealing with. In other words, according to the 
realists, scientific progress cannot be due to anything other than an approximately true 
theory, while according to the anti-realists even a false theory may constitute a genuine 
scientific progress.15 Thus, a realist interpretation of the concept of understanding gives 
rise to a realist account of scientific progress, while an anti-realist interpretation of the 
concept of understanding gives rise to an anti-realist account of scientific progress (see 
e.g. Khalifa 2011; de Regt, Gijsbers 2017). Both those interpretations have been 
advanced and defended in the last years.16  
Consider now that we are dealing here with the noetic account, and that, as we have 
already noted above, Dellsén takes it to be a realist account of progress. So, we can 
conclude that Dellsén adopts a realist stance on understanding, and thinks that, in the 
                                                 
13 Cf. Dellsén 2016, p. 73, fn. 6: “the noetic account amounts to a moderately realist view of the 
aim of science.” 
14 Several very different views have been advanced on the requirements that have to be fulfilled 
in order to have understanding (see for a survey Baumberger, Beisbart, Brun 2017). The main 
distinction is between those authors who think that understanding is just a species of knowledge 
(and so there is not a real distinction between these two concepts, see Grimm 2006), and those 
who, on the contrary, think that understanding is not just a species of knowledge (see Dellsén 
2016b). Those who belong to this latter group have different ideas on how exactly understanding 
differs from knowledge. They usually claim that understanding lacks one or more of the traditional 
knowledge requirements, i.e. truth, justification, and some anti-luck condition. Here we will follow 
Dellsén’s characterization of understanding, and assume, at least for the sake of the argument, that 
understanding is not just a species of knowledge. 
15 The idea that empirical success is a good indicator of truth is a pillar of scientific realism (see 
e.g. Wray 2013). Thus, a realist view of scientific progress cannot completely sever the link 
between the empirical success of a theory and its truth. 
16 See e.g. Kvanvig (2003), who maintains that the truth requirement is necessary for 
understanding; Elgin (2007), who maintains that we may have understanding even through 
falsities; Rancourt (2015), who maintains that, in certain circumstances, an increase in truth-
content may even lead to a decrease in understanding. 
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ultimate analysis, understanding depends on the truth of the theory we are dealing with. 
But if understanding depends on truth as knowledge does, how is it possible that it differs 
from knowledge in such a way that the noetic account is able to account for those cases 
that the epistemic account is not able to account for precisely because of the rigidity of its 
truth requirement?  
Dellsén, in order to maintain both the claim that there is a relevant difference between 
understanding and knowledge with respect to the truth requirement, and the claim that the 
noetic account, which is based on the concept of understanding, is a realist account of 
progress, adopts a line of reasoning developed by some epistemologists in recent years, 
and takes understanding to be a quasi-factive concept.17 
Knowledge is usually considered to be factive: if a person has the belief that p, she 
does not know that p unless ‘p’ is true.18 Understanding would instead be quasi-factive, in 
the sense that it is not necessary that each component of a theory be true to make this 
theory able to increase understanding. It is sufficient that “the explanatorily/predictively 
essential elements of a theory” be “true in order for the theory to provide grounds for 
understanding” (Dellsén 2016a, p. 73, fn. 6). On this view, at the “periphery” of a theory 
there well may be inaccuracies, falsities, abstractions, idealizations, i.e. all those elements 
that prevent us from baldly claiming that a theory is straightforwardly “true” and that 
everything it states constitutes “knowledge”. And those elements may even contribute in 
some way and to some extent to the understanding of the target phenomenon. But what, 
in ultimate analysis, grounds our understanding of a phenomenon is the truth of the 
“central propositions” of the theory we are dealing with (Kvanvig 2009; Mizrahi 2012). 
In this way, the abilities of making predictions and providing explanations of some 
phenomenon are not completely severed by the possession of some relevant truths about 
this phenomenon. And according to Dellsén, this would be sufficient both (1) to consider 
the noetic account a realist account of progress, and (2) to consider genuine contributions 
to progress those cases in which understanding increases thanks to a theory replete with 
elements that are not strictly true, i.e. elements whose presence prevents us to claim that 
knowledge also increases, since knowledge is a more demanding concept.  
If we conceive of understanding in this way, understanding admits of degrees, while 
knowledge is an all or nothing matter. There is no such thing as degrees of knowing: 
either you know or you don’t. This is mainly due to the fact that truth is an all or nothing 
matter. Since knowledge requires truth, and truth does not admit of degrees, knowledge 
does not admit of degrees in its turn. Thus, understanding may increase even if there is 
not an increase in the truth content of the theory we are dealing with, if some, strictly 
speaking, false elements of a theory allow us to make better predictions or provide better 
explanations of the target phenomenon. From this, it follows that while it makes no sense 
to claim that a true theory is more true than another true theory, it makes perfect sense to 
claim that a theory provides a better understanding of a phenomenon than another theory. 
Since there may be an increase in understanding even if there is not an increase in the 
truth content of a theory, there may be an increase in the understanding of a phenomenon 
even if there is not an increase in our knowledge relative to such phenomenon.  
                                                 
17 On the quasi-factivity of understanding, see Kvanvig (2009), and Mizrahi (2012). For some 
criticisms of this view, see Elgin (2009), and de Regt, Gijsbers (2017). 
18 Many authors argue that knowledge is a factive propositional attitude. To say that a 
propositional attitude is factive is to say that “it is impossible for you to have that attitude towards 
anything other than a true proposition” (Pritchard, Turri 2014), where “true” has to be intended in 
the sense of “corresponding to facts”. Williamson (2000) argues that knowledge is the most 
general factive propositional attitude. For a radically different view on knowledge, see Cellucci 
(2017). 
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According to Dellsén, those features of the concept of understanding make it perfectly 
suited to account for scientific progress, and for other relevant aspects of scientific 
practice, such as the use of highly idealized models in science. 
  
 
5. The noetic conception as a realist conception of progress 
 
In order to assess Dellsén’s claim that the noetic account is a more adequate realist 
account of progress than the epistemic account, we will leave aside many of the criticisms 
that have been raised against the quasi-factive view of understanding.19 We will instead 
try to develop an argument elaborating on some works of Barrett (2003, 2008), Stanford 
(2003), and Saatsi (2016). This argument aims at showing that, if understanding is quasi-
factive, the noetic account may face some difficulties in accounting for the case of the 
incompatibility of Quantum Mechanics (QM) and General Theory of Relativity (GTR), 
and that this impinges on Dellsén’s claim that the noetic account is an adequate realist 
view of progress. 
QM and GTR are certainly our current best scientific theories, in any sense in which 
‘best’ is usually intended by philosophers of science. In a realist perspective, since 
scientific realism claims that our best theories are true (Chakravartty 2015), both QM and 
GTR should be regarded as true or, at least, approximately true. Thus, a realist view of 
scientific progress should account for QM and GTR accordingly.  
But there is a problem. Roughly, we know that QM and GTR are incompatible, in the 
sense that, due to the different fundamental theoretical assumptions they make, they 
provide two contradictory descriptions of the world (see e.g. Macías, Camacho 2008). 
And to the extent that two incompatible theories cannot both be true, we know that QM 
and GTR cannot both be true (Barrett 2003; Bueno 2017).20 
Let’s try to consider how Dellsén’s proposal would account for this case. Since the 
noetic account rests on the concept of understanding, and conceives of understanding as 
our ability in making predictions or providing explanations, if we adopt the noetic view, 
we should admit that QM and GTR constitute genuine cases of scientific progress. 
Indeed, since they are the most powerful theories we have, we can fairly affirm that they 
allow us to make accurate predictions and provide deep explanations of a large class of 
phenomena.  
But recall that according to Dellsén, the noetic account rests on a quasi-factive 
conception of understanding. In this view, the abilities of making predictions and 
providing explanations that QM and GTR give us, have to be due, in ultimate analysis, to 
the truth of the “essential elements” of those theories. If this is the case, then QM and 
GTR may be deemed to be (approximately) true, at least in their essential theoretical 
‘core’. But if QM and GTR are both (approximately) true (at least) in their essential 
theoretical ‘core’, they should not be radically incompatible, at least in principle. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus among scientists and philosophers of science on 
the claim that QM and GTR are in fact radically incompatible. 
                                                 
19 The main criticism to the quasi-factive view of understanding is the one developed by Elgin 
(2007; 2009), who shows how in many cases idealizations and other ‘untrue’ elements of a 
scientific theory are “central terms” of that theory, not peripheral. They are “essential elements of 
a theory” that cannot be replaced, nor are expected to be replaced in the future by scientists. 
20 It is worth noticing that this argument does not rest on a sort of pessimistic induction over past 
science (Laudan 1981), as many anti-realist arguments do. And so it does not display the weakness 
that is usually thought to afflict that kind of arguments, i.e. their inductive character (Barrett 
2003). Indeed, the argument we are dealing with here is based on the theoretical impossibility of 
reconciling the images of the world provided by our current most powerful scientific theories. 
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There seems to be a tension here. As we will see below, the supporter of the noetic 
account may try to solve this difficulty either by accepting the claim that QM and GTR 
are incompatible, and so that one of those theories is false (sec. 5.1), or by denying this 
claim, and so maintaining that both those theories are true (sec. 5.2). 
 
 
5.1. First option: affirming the incompatibility of QM and GTR  
 
Let’s consider the hypothesis that QM and GTR are really incompatible, and so they 
cannot both be true. This would mean that even the ‘essential elements’ of at least one of 
QM and GTR are not true. Since, as we have seen, the supporter of the noetic account 
should consider both QM and GTR to be cases of progress, this leads her to a dilemma: 1) 
either she has to admit that the noetic view is not able to account for the fact that a theory 
whose ‘essential elements’ are false may nevertheless increase our understanding; 2) or 
she has to claim that such a theory has never really increased our understanding, given 
that its ‘essential elements’ were false.  
Both the horns of this dilemma are problematic to take. Indeed, if one takes 1), one 
has to admit that the noetic account is an inadequate account of scientific progress, 
because it is not able to account for such a relevant case, i.e. that a radically false theory 
may constitute progress. If, on the other hand, the supporter of the noetic account takes 
2), she finds herself in a position that is in some way similar to the one in which the 
supporter of the epistemic account finds herself if she tries to consider Einstein’s work a 
case of progress (see above, sec. 3.1).  
Let’s try to see why. As we have seen, according to Dellsén’s criteria, both QM and 
GTR are cases of progress, since they increase our understanding. But according to the 
quasi-factive view of understanding, if QM and GTR are radically incompatible, they 
cannot both be genuine cases of progress. If we want to maintain the quasi-factive view, 
we have to deny that one of QM and GTR really provides understanding. But at the 
moment we are not able to assess, between QM and GTR, which is the approximately 
true theory and which is the one that will be discarded because its essential elements will 
be proven false. According to our current standards, they are both extremely empirically 
successful.  
To face this difficulty, we may be tempted to claim that QM and GTR provide us just 
a sort of hypothetical understanding, i.e. the understanding that a theory would provide if 
its essential elements are true. In this view, when in the future the theory whose essential 
elements are true will be identified, we will be able to assess which theory between QM 
and GTR really increases our understanding, and so constitutes a genuine case of 
progress. But if the verdict on the progressiveness of QM and GTR is made dependent on 
(an eventual) future confirmation of the truth of their essential elements, we would not be 
really able to claim now that they constituted genuine cases of progress when they were 
formulated, exactly as the epistemic account was unable to claim that Einstein’s paper 
constituted a genuine progress when it appeared in 1905.  
But the idea of making our judgment over the progressiveness of a case dependent on 
future confirmation is exactly what Dellsén deemed unacceptable in considering the 
attempt of rescuing the epistemic account with respect to Einstein’s work by considering 
it a case of hypothetical explanatory knowledge. Now, as we have seen, the epistemic 
account faces a dilemma: either it is not able to consider Einstein’s work a case of 
progress, or, if it tries to rely on the idea of hypothetical explanatory knowledge to 
account for such a case, it is no more able to rule out Oresme’s solution from the set of 
genuine cases of progress. In a similar way, the noetic account faces a dilemma with 
regard to QM and GTR: either it is not able to rule out the false theory between QM and 
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GTR, or if it tries to rely on the idea of hypothetical understanding to discriminate 
between these two cases, it is no more able to claim now whether they are genuine cases 
of progress or not. 
Moreover, the strategy of making our judgment over the progressiveness of a case 
dependent on future confirmation faces two more general problems. The first is the risk of 
a regress. If at any time tx, the supporter of the noetic account has to wait for the truth of 
the essential elements of our current best theory to be confirmed by future science at time 
tx+n in order to judge its progressiveness, then she risks being able to correctly determine 
what episodes in the history of science constituted genuine cases of progress only at the 
end of time. Indeed, the truth of the essential elements of any past theory can be 
determined only in the light of our best current theory. But the truth of the essential 
elements of our best current theory is determinable only by future science (Barrett 2008; 
Stanford 2003; more on this below). It is also conceivable that in the light of future 
science, say at time tx+n, the essential elements of some past theory T that we now, at time 
tx, deem true in the light of our current science will be discarded and regarded as false. 
So, there is the risk that we may have to modify our verdicts on the progressiveness of 
any past episode at any future time. 
The second general problem that this strategy faces is that, if we have to wait for some 
future confirmation to judge over the progressiveness of an episode, the distinction 
between the noetic account and the epistemic account fades. Indeed, Dellsén explicitly 
argues (see above, sec. 3.1) that these accounts are distinct because the noetic account is 
able to determine whether a theory is progressive by focusing on the historical context in 
which it is proposed, i.e. on the contribution to the understanding of a phenomenon that it 
provides at the time of its formulation, independently of whether this theory will later be 
confirmed or not, while the epistemic account, since it rests on the concept of knowledge, 
has to wait for a theory to be confirmed to regard it as an instance of progress. If 
confirmation is also required by the noetic account, the noetic account becomes 
equivalent to the epistemic account.21  
To conclude, if we take 2), i.e. we claim that one of QM and GTR has never really 
increased our understanding, since its ‘essential elements’ are false, this would amount to 
admit that there may be cases in which an increase in our ability to make predictions and 
provide explanations increases while our understanding does not increase. This kind of 
case could not be accounted for by the noetic view, since these cases contradict the 
qualifying claim of the noetic account, namely that scientific progress has to be identified 
with an increase in understanding. 
Thus, since neither 1), nor 2) seem to be a viable route to take for the supporter of the 
noetic account, it is fair to conclude that the first option we considered, i.e. affirming that 
QM and GTR are really incompatible, is not a promising way to solve the problem of 
accounting for the incompatibility of QM and GTR if we adopt the noetic account. 
 
                                                 
21 There are some additional difficulties for Dellsén’s account worth being pointed out: the first is 
that it is true that if QM and GTR are incompatible, at least one of them cannot be true. But we 
cannot exclude that neither is. How would the noetic view account for the possibility that, in light 
of future science, the essential elements of both QM and GTR will be deemed untrue? Shall we 
then claim that neither QM nor GTR were cases of progress when they were formulated and 
applied? In the same vein: even if we concede that future confirmation will allow us to determine 
that one theory between QM and GTR really increases our understanding because of the truth of 
its essential elements, there will still be the difficulty for the supporter of the noetic account to 
explain the empirical success enjoyed by the other radically ‘false’ theory, given that it is 
uncontroversial that both QM and GTR are extremely successful in dealing with the world, and 
that the noetic account claims to be a realist account of progress. 
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5.2. Second option: denying the incompatibility of QM and GTR 
 
The supporter of the noetic account may try to defend her view by claiming that QM and 
GTR are not really incompatible, that they are both approximately true theories, and that 
their now seeming incompatibility derives exclusively from some of their non-essential 
elements, which could be amended in the future. If this is the case, both QM and GTR 
can be regarded as genuine cases of progress in light of the noetic account. 
There are two main and related problems with this line of reasoning. The first is that 
the claim that QM and GTR are not really incompatible contradicts the ‘received view’ 
among scientists and philosophers on this issue. Obviously, this is not a decisive 
rejoinder, but it is a reminder of the fact that the burden of proof of the claim that such a 
deep incompatibility as the one that obtains between QM and GTR may be due to the 
incompatibility of just some peripheral elements of those theories, is on the supporter of 
this line of defense. And proving such a claim is not an easy task (Barrett 2008). 
The second, and more difficult, problem is that this defense of the noetic account 
postpones the ascertainment of the (approximate) truth of QM and GTR to some future 
time, and this makes this line of defense ineffective. 
Indeed, QM and GTR are our current best theories. From a realist point of view, we 
can at most hypothesize that they are (approximately) true, since they are actually 
enjoying huge empirical success. Nevertheless, as realists themselves usually 
acknowledge, this kind of inference “from the success to the truth” of a theory is 
insufficient to establish with certainty that a theory is actually true. There is always the 
possibility that a theory, even if by our current standards empirically successful, will be 
dismissed and deemed to be false in light of future science. Thus, we cannot, at the 
moment, estimate the degree of approximation to the truth of QM and GTR, nor can we, 
strictly speaking, even really claim that they are “approximately” true in any meaningful 
sense, since we cannot assess their approximation to the truth in the same way we usually 
do in order to maintain that a past theory is approximately true. Indeed, we can claim that 
a past theory T was approximately true, only by comparing it with our best (and more 
complete) current theory T* of the same domain (Stanford 2003). In the case of QM and 
GTR, since they are our current best theories, we cannot estimate their approximation to 
the truth by comparing them to a more complete theory that we deem to be true (Barrett 
2008). 
To better see this point, consider Newtonian Gravitation (NG): realists may claim that 
NG is approximately true, since they are able to compare NG to GTR, and thus show that 
the former can be derived as a special case of the latter (Saatsi 2016; Barrett 2008). But it 
would be pointless to claim that GTR is “approximately true”, since we do not know what 
it may approximate. Since GTR is so successful, we use it to estimate the degree of 
“approximation” to the truth of past theories, but we cannot say that GTR is 
approximating some more true theory. Nor can we claim that GTR is the true and definite 
theory, since we know that it is theoretically unable to explain the phenomena pertaining 
to a relevant domain of nature (the domain of QM), and that it is incompatible with QM. 
So, even if we think that QM and GTR are not really radically incompatible, and that they 
are both approximately true, this very fact means that none of them can be the definite 
theory. At most, it may be claimed that they both approximate the same future definite 
theory. 
It may be claimed that in the future there will certainly be developed a theory TX, and 
that it will be possible to show that GTR approximates TX, in the same way in which it 
has been possible to show that NG approximates GTR. But this claim is just as 
compelling as any other induction is, since it rests on our hope that the future will 
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resemble the past. We have no effective way to support the claim that GTR will be 
proven to approximate TX, since we have no way to know what TX may look like. Since 
we are unable to compare TX and GTR, we are unable to assess whether GTR 
approximates TX. We cannot rule out the possibility that GTR and TX will be radically 
distinct, and that the essential elements of GTR will be deemed to be false in the light of 
TX. If this is the case, GTR would be a false but empirically successful theory, and so it 
cannot be claimed to be approximately true. Given that QM and GTR are incompatible, 
and that this may imply that GTR is in reality radically false (since, even if we are now 
considering the possibility that QM and GTR are not radically incompatible, we have not 
yet succeeded in showing that in fact they are compatible), this scenario is not 
implausible, and so cannot be easily dismissed. This argument may be developed, mutatis 
mutandis, with regard to the claim that QM will approximate TX.  
It may be objected that if QM and GTR are not really incompatible, i.e. their 
incompatibility is due just to some of their peripheral elements, then it is not true that TX 
is completely undetermined. We have some clues of how TX should be: if we take that 
GTR’s essential elements are true, since GTR constitutes progress and we adopt a realist 
view of progress, then TX should retain GTR’s essential elements and dismiss just the 
false, peripheral elements of GTR. Moreover, because of this continuity between GTR 
and TX, TX should be such that GTR may be derived from it as a special case, in the 
same way in which NG is derivable from GTR.  
The problem is that, even if we concede that TX will have to meet these constrains, we 
are nevertheless still unable to effectively determine whether GTR really approximates 
TX. The fact is that we have no idea how GTR should be modified in order to be 
improved.22 We do not know now what elements will be deemed central and what 
elements will be deemed peripheral, and so dismissed, in the future in light of TX (Barrett 
2003).23 Such a distinction between central and peripheral elements will be possible only 
after TX will have been elaborated and confirmed. Think again of NG. If we accept the 
line of reasoning we are analyzing, we should maintain that, by reasoning alone, at 
Newton’s time, it would have been possible to determine (at least to some extent) the 
form that GTR should have taken, and what elements of NG would have consequently 
been deemed essentials. If this were the case, it would have been possible to compare NG 
and GTR (before this last one had even been actually elaborated), and safely claim that 
NG approximates GTR. But things go the other way around. It is starting from GTR that 
we can now claim what elements of NG are essential and what “errors” or “falsities” are 
embedded in NG. And it is in large part due to the post-GTR development of a 
geometrized version of NG, which is empirically equivalent to NG, “but absorbs all the 
information about gravitational forces into information about spacetime curvature so that 
gravitation is rendered a manifestation of spacetime curvature” (Saatsi 2016, p. 9), that 
we are now able to understand how NG may be shown to be a special case of GTR, and 
thus why we can safely claim that NG approximates GTR.24 
                                                 
22 Cf. Barrett 2003, p. 1216: “While we do have a vague commitment that our future physical 
theories will somehow be better than our current physical theories, we do not now know how they 
will be better. If we did, we would immediately incorporate this insight into our current physical 
theories.” 
23  Cf. Barrett 2003, p. 1216: “insofar as we expect surprising innovations in the construction of 
future theories [...], we cannot now know even what the structure of the space of possible options 
for refining our current theories will prove to be.” This point cannot be developed here, but it is 
worth underlining that this line of reasoning is analogous to the unconceived alternatives argument 
developed by Stanford (2006), who elaborates on Sklar (1981). 
24 See also Barrett (2008). For more details, see Malament (1986a, 1986b). 
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To sum up, if we try to defend the noetic account maintaining that QM and GTR are 
not really incompatible and are both approximately true, in order to make our defense 
effective, we should be able to compare QM and GTR to the theories (or the theory) that 
will replace them in the future. But, since we have no idea about what such future 
theories may look like, we are not able to show that QM and GTR approximate them, and 
so we cannot claim that QM and GTR are approximately true. So, it does not seem easy 
to find a way to defend the claim that the incompatibility between QM and GTR is due 
just to some of their peripheral elements. Thus, taking the second option, i.e. maintaining 
that QM and GTR are not really incompatible, does not seem to be a promising way to 
defend the noetic account. 
Since neither the first option nor the second option we considered seems to provide a 
viable route to take for the supporter of the noetic account, we can fairly conclude that the 
problem of the incompatibility between QM and GTR represents a serious challenge for 
the noetic account. 
 
 
6. Factivity and modality 
    
From what we have said so far, it seems that the supporter of the noetic account faces a 
dilemma: either 1) she dismisses the noetic account as inadequate, or 2) she dismisses her 
quasi-factive view of understanding. Indeed, if she tries to rescue the realist construal of 
the noetic account by adopting a full-blooded factive view of understanding, she risks 
being unable to distinguish understanding from knowledge, and so to let the noetic 
account become equivalent to the epistemic view. But if she discards the quasi-factive 
view and adopt a non-factive view of understanding, she has to dismiss the claim that the 
noetic account is a realist account of progress, since adopting a non-factive view would 
amount to admitting that even a radically false theory may constitute progress, a claim 
that realists usually deny.  
But there may still be another option for the supporter of the noetic account who wants 
to maintain the claim that the noetic account is a realist account of progress. Rice (2016) 
has recently claimed that we can construe the idealized models commonly used in science 
in a realist fashion, even if we concede that they do not accurately represent the way the 
world really is, and that they indispensably rest on idealized assumptions, i.e. even if 
some of their essential elements are known to be false. Rice’s aim is to solve the 
difficulty that the realist has to face when she tries to account for the role that 
idealizations play in science, a theme deeply connected with the debate on the concept of 
understanding (Elgin 2009; Saatsi 2016). In a nutshell, Rice suggests that highly idealized 
models may nevertheless provide factive scientific understanding, since they give us true 
modal information about the counterfactual relevance and irrelevance of various features 
of the target system. So, despite their representations being inaccurate and many of their 
assumptions being false, those models may increase our understanding. This view of 
understanding seems to be compatible with the noetic account, because, despite the fact 
that Rice names his view of understanding ‘factive’, he does not construe ‘factive’ in a 
too demanding way as necessarily requiring truth: “my view is that scientific 
understanding is factive because in order to genuinely understand a natural phenomenon 
most of what one believes about that phenomenon [...] must be true” (Rice 2016, p. 86). 
This may be sufficient for distinguishing the concept of ‘understanding’ from the concept 
PENULTIMATE DRAFT – PLEASE CITE THE PUBLISHED VERSION 
To appear in: Danks, D.; Ippoliti, E. (eds.), Building Theories, Springer, Cham. 
 
20 
 
of ‘knowledge’. Thus, it seems, at least prima facie, that Rice’s proposal may be 
compatible with Dellsén’s account of progress.25 
Relying on Rice’s proposal, the supporter of the noetic account may try to account in a 
realist fashion for those cases in which a theory provides an increase in our understanding 
even if its essential elements have to be considered, strictly speaking, false. This kind of 
case is exactly the one we analysed above (sec. 5) with respect to the incompatibility 
between QM and GTR. By adopting Rice’s view, the supporter of the noetic account may 
claim that, even if in the future one of QM and GTR (or both of them) will be deemed to 
be strictly speaking false, this false theory is nevertheless really increasing our 
understanding, and so it constitutes a genuine instance of progress. She may also maintain 
that the previous claim is compatible with the idea that the noetic account is a realist 
conception of scientific progress, arguing that such a false theory, despite the falsity of its 
essential elements, provides us true modal information on some relevant aspect of the 
pertinent phenomena, and it is this true modal information that is responsible for the 
increase of our understanding. Since in this view the truth requirement is, at least to some 
extent, fulfilled by the modal essential element of the theory, this may well be claimed to 
be a realist view of progress: “it is the model’s ability to provide true modal information 
about the space of possibilities that enables the model to produce” scientific 
understanding (Rice 2016, p. 92).  
The main problem with this approach is that, in order to salvage the claim that only 
true elements may be responsible for an increase in understanding, it assumes that a false 
theory may convey true modal knowledge.  
Now, let’s concede, for the sake of the argument, that it may be possible to provide a 
coherent realist notion of “a false theory that is able to convey true modal information”, 
and that it may also be possible to provide an account of how a theory such as QM or 
GTR may be considered an instance of this kind of false theory. The problem on which 
we will focus is that this ‘move’ amounts to embracing modal realism. In other words, if 
the supporter of the realist account tries to salvage her realist view of progress by relying 
on Rice’s proposal, she commits herself to modal realism. But this commitment may be 
challenging for her. 
Indeed, if a theory is supposed to be able to provide true modal knowledge, this means 
that we assume that modal knowledge is possible, i.e. that we are able to know what is 
necessary and what is possible. Since we are dealing here with a realist conception of 
understanding, and since the theory we are considering is supposed to be false, the 
element that has to be true, in order to fulfill the realist truth requirement, is the modal 
information provided by the theory. Indeed, if we take an anti-realist stance on modality, 
nothing is left in the theory which can be regarded as ‘true’ from a realist point of view, 
and so Rice’s conception of understanding cannot be applied, nor can the noetic account 
be claimed to be a realist account of progress anymore. So, if we adopt Rice’s proposal to 
support the noetic account, we have to take the modal information provided by the theory 
as true, and we have to intend ‘true’ in a realist sense. In the context of modal 
epistemology, this usually amounts to adopting some formulation of ‘possible worlds’ 
modal realism, a view which has been fiercely disputed and it is certainly not easy to 
defend (Vaidya 2016; Bueno 2017).  
It may be objected that the true modal information provided by the false theory refers 
only to some actual features of the relevant phenomena, and that this fact disposes us to 
                                                 
25 Some work would be necessary to generalize Rice’s proposal and make it suitable to account 
for the case of the incompatibility between QM and GTR, since Rice (2016) refers just to some 
kinds of models, and especially focuses on some optimality models used in biology, while QM and 
GTR are theories. This point cannot be developed here, but a promising route may be to adopt the 
semantic view of theories, according to which a theory is the class of its models. 
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commit ourselves to some possible-worlds construal of modality, since in this case we do 
not have to account for non-actual possible features of the relevant phenomena, and so we 
can avoid making reference to non-actual possibilities in terms of possible worlds, which 
are ontologically dubious and epistemically inaccessible entities. Indeed, if the theory 
tells us what is actual, from what is actual we can safely infer what is actually possible 
without making reference to any world other than ours (Bueno 2017).  
But, even granting for the moment the ‘soundness’ of this objection, it seems to be 
inadequate. Let’s try to see why. Rice (2016) distinguishes between system-specific 
models and hypothetical models. System-specific models provide accurate information 
about the counterfactual relevance and irrelevance of salient features of the target system. 
On the contrary, hypothetical models are not intended to accurately represent any 
particular features of a real-world system, i.e. “the model has no real-world ‘target 
system’ whose (difference-making) features it aims to accurately represent” (Rice 2016, 
p. 91). To sum up, “system-specific models aim to provide ‘how actually’ information 
while hypothetical models typically aim to provide ‘how possibly’ information” (Rice 
2016, p. 92). Now, if we try to adapt Rice’s proposal to the noetic perspective on the 
falsity of one of QM and GTR, we have to keep in mind that here we are dealing with a 
theory that is, by hypothesis, radically false, i.e. whose essential elements are false. So, it 
is reasonable to think that such a theory would be considered, in the modified noetic 
account that we have assumed it is possible to elaborate according to Rice’s proposal, as 
being analogous to Rice’s hypothetical models, and not to Rice’s system-specific models. 
Indeed, if such a theory is radically false, this means that it does not accurately tell us 
anything about the actual target system, otherwise some of its essential elements would 
have been true. If this is the case, the objection mentioned above does not hold, since 
hypothetical models do not provide us with modal information about actual features of 
the target phenomenon; they instead provide information about non-actual possibilities of 
the target phenomenon: they “explore the possibility space in which features differ [...] 
dramatically from those of the actual system” (Rice 2016, p. 92, fn. 12). Thus, this is not 
a viable route for the supporter of the noetic account to avoid the commitment to some 
formulation of possible-worlds modal realism. 
 
 
7. Understanding and modalism 
 
There are several difficulties that arise for the supporter of the noetic account from her 
commitment to such a disputed view as possible-worlds modal realism.26 Perhaps the 
main difficulty comes from the fact that the noetic account aims to be a realist account of 
scientific progress. Many scientific realists think of themselves as naturalists, i.e. they 
adopt a naturalist stance (Morganti 2016). But it is at least very controversial whether 
possible-worlds modal realism may be compatible with a naturalist stance. Indeed, modal 
realists claim that, for every way the world could be, there is a world that is that way 
(Lewis 1986). This means to assume that if something is impossible in our world but it is 
conceivable, it is true in some other possible world causally isolated from ours. This 
contrasts with the way ‘naturalism’ is usually construed, i.e. as implying that natural 
entities are all there is, and that for an entity to be regarded as natural, it has to not be in 
principle spatiotemporally and causally isolated from our world (Papineau 2016).27 
                                                 
26 For a survey of the problems afflicting possible-worlds modal realism, see Vaidya (2016), 
Bueno (2017), Bueno, Shalkowski (2004). 
27 The adoption of possible-worlds modal realism amounts to assuming that there is something 
“like a realm of metaphysical possibility and necessity that outstrips the possibility and necessity 
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In any case, we will put aside these difficulties here, and we will grant that there is an 
escape route for the supporter of the noetic account, i.e. another promising realist view of 
modality to take, which does not rest on possible worlds, i.e. modalism, according to 
which modality is a primitive notion (Bueno 2017; Bueno, Shalkowski 2004).  
Let’s grant, for argument’s sake at least, that modalism is able to avoid or solve many 
of the problems that afflict possible-worlds modal realism (Vaidya 2016, sec. 1.2.3). The 
problem that we will try to point out is that this account of modality seems to be in 
conflict with a (quasi-)factive view of understanding, i.e. the view of understanding 
advocated by Dellsén. 
Modalism draws on an analogy between modal and mathematical knowledge 
originally developed by Lewis (1986), but it reaches different conclusions:  
 
the key idea is that we have mathematical knowledge by drawing (truth-preserving) 
consequences from (true) mathematical principles. And we have modal knowledge 
by drawing (truth-preserving) consequences from (true) modal principles. (Bueno, 
Shalkowski 2004, p. 97). 
 
 According to this view, to know that P is possible (or necessary) means to derive “it 
is possible that P” from particular assumptions. More precisely, to know that P is possible 
amounts to being entitled to introduce a possibility operator: it is possible that P. In some 
cases, it is easy to do so: we know that P is actual, and therefore possible. But in many 
cases, P is not actual. So, in these cases, when we claim that ‘we know that P is possible’, 
what we are really doing is deriving it is possible that P from some particular 
assumptions. 
Here the different way in which Bueno and Shalkowski interpret the analogy between 
modality and mathematics marks their distance from Lewis’s approach. In a nutshell, they 
develop this analogy as implying that in those cases in which we cannot know (by 
empirical means) that P is actual, the modal knowledge that we can at most reach is 
conditional, i.e. it is of the form: «‘it is possible that P’ is true, given that the assumptions 
on which we rest to derive ‘it is possible that P’ are true». 
As in mathematics, due to Gödel’s results, we are generally unable to prove with 
certainty that the axioms of the theory we use to derive a theorem T are ‘true’, and we 
take our knowledge of such theorem to be of the form: «the theorem T is true, if the 
axioms from which it is derived are true»; when dealing with modality we are unable to 
prove that the modal principles that we choose in order to derive the target conclusion are 
true.28 Indeed, in many cases the possibility of determining whether something is possible 
                                                                                                                                     
that science deals with, but this is exactly what naturalists should not be willing to concede” 
(Morganti 2016, p. 87). 
28 On the consequences of Gödel’s results for how mathematical knowledge should be conceived, 
see Cellucci (2017, 2013). On how modalism construes the analogy between modality and 
mathematics, cf. Bueno, Shalkowski 2004, p. 97-98: “If the analogy with mathematics is taken 
seriously, it may actually provide a reason to doubt that we have any knowledge of modality. One 
of the main challenges for platonism about mathematics comes from the epistemological front, 
given that we have no access to mathematical entities – and so it’s difficult to explain the 
reliability of our mathematical beliefs. The same difficulty emerges for modal realism, of course. 
After all, despite the fact that, on Lewis’ account, possible worlds are concrete objects, rather than 
abstract ones, we have no access to them. Reasons to be skeptical about a priori knowledge 
regarding mathematics can be easily ‘transferred’ to the modal case, in the sense that difficulties 
we may have to establish a given mathematical statement may have a counterpart in establishing 
certain modal claims. For example, how can we know that a mathematical theory, say ZFC, is 
consistent? Well, we can’t know that in general; we have, at best, relative consistency proofs. And 
the consistency of the set theories in which such proofs are carried out is far more controversial 
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or not will depend on controversial assumptions. There are several incompatible and 
competing assumptions available to be taken as the starting point from which we derive 
our target conclusions on what is possible, and there is not a way of proving that such 
‘first assumptions’ are at their turn ‘true’ without ending in an infinite regress or 
committing a petitio principii. 
According to modalism, we have to accept that with respect to cases involving non-
actual possibilities, “instead of having categorical modal knowledge [...] (that is, 
knowledge of what is possible or necessary, independently of particular assumptions),” 
we can at most “have conditional modal knowledge [...] (that is, knowledge of what is 
possible or necessary given certain philosophical assumptions)” (Bueno 2017, p. 80). 
Now, in the context we are dealing with, as we have already seen above, the radically 
false theory between QM and GTR, which is supposed to be able to give us true modal 
knowledge, is supposed to convey modal information relative to non-actual possibilities. 
Thus, if we adopt modalism to escape the conundrums deriving from possible-worlds 
modal realism, we have to consider the modal knowledge provided by this false theory an 
instance of conditional knowledge. The problem is that conditional knowledge is unable 
to fulfill the realist requirement that is necessary to claim that the noetic account is a 
realist account of scientific progress. Indeed, if we adopt Dellsén’s and Rice’s (quasi-
)factive view of understanding, instances of conditional modal knowledge cannot be 
considered to be able to increase our understanding, since we cannot assess whether they 
are really true. 
Thus, modalism is not really a viable route to take for the supporter of the noetic 
account: if she tries to rely on Rice’s proposal and ‘go modal’ to face the challenge 
deriving from the incompatibility of QM and GTR, she seems unable to avoid committing 
herself to possible-worlds modal realism. 
      
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have tried to assess whether the noetic account is a more adequate 
realist account of progress than the epistemic account. We elaborated an argument that 
aims to show how the quasi-factive view of understanding that Dellsén adopts in order to 
maintain that the noetic view is a realist account of progress is in tension with Dellsén’s 
definition of understanding. We examined a possible way out for Dellsén, the adoption of 
Rice’s proposal that highly idealized models may nevertheless provide us factive 
scientific understanding by giving us true modal information about pertinent phenomena. 
But this shift to modality comes with a cost for the supporter of the noetic account: it 
implies that she has to commit herself to possible-worlds modal realism, an option that 
may be unpalatable for many scientific realists. Finally, we have proposed another way 
out for Dellsén, i.e. the adoption of modalism. But we showed that modalism is not able 
to support a realist view of understanding.  
To sum up: if the supporter of the noetic account wants to maintain the standard way 
to conceive of knowledge and understanding, she faces the following dilemma: either 1) 
she dismisses the noetic account as an inadequate realist account, or 2) she dismisses her 
quasi-factive view of understanding. If she tries to escape this dilemma by ‘going modal’, 
she faces a new dilemma: either 1) she commits herself to possible-worlds modal realism, 
or 2) she dismisses her quasi-factive view of understanding.  
                                                                                                                                     
than the consistency of ZCF itself, given that such theories need to postulate the existence of 
inaccessible cardinals and other objects of this sort.” 
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In both these dilemmas, to take option 1) is very difficult: in the first case, it amounts 
to admitting that the noetic account does not really fare better than Bird’s view, while in 
the second case, it implies adopting such a controversial perspective on modality that 
many scientific realists may tend to prefer Bird’s view in any case. If one of the main 
rationales for develop the noetic account was advancing the epistemic view, this seems 
not to be a good result. We think that option 2) is the more promising one. Obviously, 
taking 2) amounts to dismissing the idea that the noetic account is a realist account of 
progress, and this may seem an even worse result than the one that can be achieved by 
choosing 1). But we instead think that this option is worth further investigation, since 
developing an anti-realist noetic account of scientific progress, which relies on a well-
defended anti-realist view of understanding, as e.g. the one recently provided by de Regt 
and Gijsbers (2017),29 may be the best way to emphasize the several interesting features 
that the noetic account displays, and let it spread all its theoretical fertility without having 
to struggle with the conundrums arising from the adoption of possible-worlds modal 
realism.  
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